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OPINION OF THE COURT

*

Honorable Paul S. Diamond, United States District
Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by
designation.
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Melrose, Inc. (“Melrose”) brought this action challenging
the Pittsburgh Zoning Board’s rejection of its applications to
change the Identification Signs on five Pittsburgh buildings.
The proposed building names included “wehirenurses.com
building” and “palegalhelp.com.”
The Zoning Board
determined that the signs were Advertising Signs and were
therefore prohibited in the zoning districts where Melrose’s
buildings were located. In reaching this decision, the Zoning
Board applied four criteria that it had articulated in a prior
decision for determining whether a sign with advertising aspects
could still be classified as a genuine Identification Sign.
Melrose challenged this decision in the District Court, arguing
that the Zoning Board’s rejection of its sign applications
violated its First Amendment free speech and Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection rights. The District Court rejected
Melrose’s claims, applying Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980),
which provides the standard for assessing restrictions on
commercial speech.
In our view, Melrose’s First Amendment claim is not
controlled by Central Hudson, but instead should be evaluated
under the test we delineated in Rappa v. New Castle County, 18
F.3d 1043 (3d Cir. 1994). Applying Rappa, we hold that the
Zoning Board’s application of the criteria constituted a
permissible “context-sensitive” analysis. We also conclude that
Melrose’s equal protection claims must fail as Melrose is simply
not similarly situated to the entities that it claims were treated
differently. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s grant of
summary judgment.
3

I.
Between May 1998 and February 1999, Melrose, a
Pennsylvania corporation, executed lease agreements with the
owners of five Pittsburgh buildings. Each lease granted Melrose
the right to name the building and to construct and display signs
on the building with that name, as well as the right to sublease
or assign these naming rights. The leases, which varied in
length from six to twenty-seven years, did not limit the number
of times that Melrose could change a building’s name.1
Starting in February 1999, Melrose filed applications
with the city’s zoning administrator to erect building
identification signs on the five properties. The process went
smoothly and the requested names were approved. The building
at 840 East Ohio Street was named “Ram Staiger,” a
combination of the building owner’s name and a business on the
premises. 2 The nearby building at 818 East Ohio Street was
named “Caskey Limited,” after the girlfriend of one of
Melrose’s officers. A building at 1217 West Carson Street was
named the “Three Rivers Building,” and one at 57 Bates Street
was named “The Cole Building,” after the son of a Melrose

1

The first lease granted Melrose naming rights to 840
East Ohio Street for approximately fifteen years, from May 27,
1998 to June 30, 2013. The second lease, for 1025-1033 Beaver
Avenue, was entered on July 8, 1998 and granted naming rights
for seventy-two months. The third lease, executed on February
9, 1999, covered a fifteen-year term for the building at 818 East
Ohio Street. An eighteen-year lease for naming rights was
signed for the building at 1217 West Carson Street. The fifth
lease was twenty-seven years in duration and applied to the
building at 57 Bates Street.
2

A second application for this building was later
accepted, which changed the name to simply “Staiger.”
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officer. The fifth building, at 1025-33 Beaver Avenue, was
named “SSSP.” 3
In March 2001, Melrose submitted applications to
rename each of the five buildings and change their signage. The
Cole Building was to be renamed the “wehirenurses.com
building.” The application included a drawing of one proposed
sign, twenty-five feet wide and twenty feet high, with
“wehirenurses.com” repeated on four separate lines and the
word “building” below that on a fifth line. The SSSP and
Caskey Limited buildings were both to be renamed
“palegalhelp.com.” The Ram Staiger building’s name was to be
changed to “Baruch Atah Hashem,” a Hebrew expression that
means “Blessed be God.” A signage application was also
submitted for the Three Rivers Building, but it did not specify
the new name. At a hearing before the Zoning Board, however,
the president of Melrose testified that he intended to change the
name of this building to “www.palegalhelp.com.” Melrose did
not propose any changes to the location, size, or shape of the
signs already in place on the buildings, but instead sought to
change only the signs’ content.
The Pittsburgh Zoning Code (“Zoning Code”)
distinguishes between three categories of signs.
These
definitions are important as Melrose sought to have its signs,
with the proposed new names, remain classified as
“Identification Signs.” “Identification Signs” are permitted in
certain zones that prohibit “Advertising Signs.” Pittsburgh Code
of Ordinances § 919.02. Section 919.01.C of the Zoning Code,
in effect at the time of Melrose’s applications, provided these
definitions:
2. Advertising Sign means a sign that directs
attention to a business, commodity, service or
entertainment, conducted, sold or offered:
(a) Only elsewhere than upon the premises where
the sign is displayed; or
3

According to the December 14, 2001 Zoning Board of
Adjustment (“Zoning Board”) decision on the renaming of this
building, there is no evidence of an application to designate this
property “SSSP.”
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(b) As a minor and incidental activity upon the
premises where the sign is displayed.
3. Business Sign means a sign that directs
attention to a business, organization, profession or
industry located upon the premises where the sign
is displayed; to the type of products sold,
manufactured or assembled; and/or to the service
or entertainment offered on such premises; except
a sign pertaining to the preceding if such activity
is only minor and incidental to the principal use of
the premises.
4. Identification Sign means a sign used to
identify the name of the individual or organization
occupying the premises; the profession of the
occupant; the name of the building on which the
sign is displayed; or the name of the major
enterprise or principal product or service on the
premises.
(J.A. at 120.) In addition to only being permitted in certain
zoning districts, “Advertising Signs” are subject, under §
919.02, to more rigorous regulations, with respect to location,
placement, size, shape, and illumination, than non-advertising
signs. These restrictions further the purposes of the Code’s sign
regulations, which include allowing advertising signs only in
locations that “neither lessen the visual attributes of the City
through the placement of such signs, nor cause confusion, safety
problems or lessen the ability to identify local businesses
through visual clutter.” Pittsburgh Code of Ordinances §
919.01.A.11.
Finding that the proposed signs’ content represented
advertising, the Zoning Administrator denied all of Melrose’s
applications. The five buildings were in zoning districts where
the Zoning Code generally prohibited Advertising Signs, but
allowed Business Signs and Identification Signs. Melrose
appealed these decisions to the Zoning Board, which conducted
consolidated hearings. It denied all five appeals in separate
decisions.

6

The Zoning Board found that the proposed signs for the
b u ild in g s t o b e n a m e d “ p a l e g a l h e l p . c o m ” a n d
“wehirenurses.com building” represented “a plan or strategy of
evasion,” which sought to avoid the Zoning Code’s restrictions
on Advertising Signs. (J.A. at 70.) As for the building to be
named “Baruch Atah Ashem,” which Melrose described as a
“religious message,” the Zoning Board found that this name did
not fit within the Zoning Code’s definition for an Identification
Sign. (Id. at 62.) The City of Pittsburgh had sent the Zoning
Board a letter advising that there was no legal basis for denying
this application on the grounds that it had no advertising
component and was a valid building name. Without addressing
the City’s position, the Zoning Board denied the application but
invited Melrose to brief the possible constitutional implications
of this particular decision. Melrose did not, however, pursue
the matter further at the Zoning Board level. As for the fifth
building, which Melrose did not provide a new name for in its
application, the Zoning Board found that the Zoning
Administrator should not have made a decision until the
application was completed. It remanded to the Zoning
Administrator so that Melrose could submit an amended
application, but a new application was never submitted.
One month before its decisions on Melrose’s appeals, the
Zoning Board had approved signs for Heinz Field, a major
football stadium that is home to the National Football League’s
Pittsburgh Steelers and the University of Pittsburgh’s football
team. The H.J. Heinz Company (“Heinz”) had entered into a
sponsorship agreement with the Steelers and had spent $57
million to obtain the naming rights to the Stadium for a period
of twenty years. Neighborhood organizations challenged the
proposed signage at Heinz Field, arguing that the signs were
Advertising Signs rather than Identification Signs and therefore
prohibited. In an interim decision in the case, issued on August
15, 2001, the Zoning Board acknowledged that certain
Identification Signs, which mention the name of a company or
product, may also have an advertising aspect. Accordingly, it
identified four attributes that an Identification Sign with an
advertising component must possess to avoid being categorized
as an Advertising Sign. The four criteria included: first, one of
the sign’s major purposes is to establish a destination point
7

generally recognized by the public at a specific location; second,
the established location is important to a material segment of the
public (for example, a sports, cultural, commercial or artistic
venue); third, “there must be evidence of intended longevity of
the sign adequate to sustain the designation point concept”; and
fourth, either the owner of the facility or its principal user
should be in control of the destiny of the sign, rather than a third
party. (Pl.’s Mot. for. Summ. J. App. at 295-96 [Pittsburgh
Zoning Board of Adjustment, Interim Decision in Zone Case 85
of 2001 (Aug. 15, 2001)].) These criteria were subsequently
cited in the decisions rejecting Melrose’s applications, although
in a slightly different formulation. In its decision applying these
criteria and approving the Heinz Field signage, the Board
recognized the advertising component of naming rights but
emphasized that the Steelers’ lengthy lease agreement for the
stadium and the lengthy sponsorship agreement reached with
Heinz reflected a “long-term commitment that the Stadium will
be known to the general public as ‘Heinz Field.’” (Supp. App.
at 10.) It concluded that the naming was not a “subterfuge to
circumvent the Code’s limitations on advertising” but instead a
legitimate attempt to name the stadium, albeit with a natural
consequence of advertising and marketing benefits for Heinz.
(Id.)
In its subsequent decisions rejecting Melrose’s
applications, the Zoning Board offered a slightly different
articulation of the attributes that it would consider necessary for
“a purported ‘Identification Sign’ . . . to avoid being categorized
as an Advertising Sign.” (J.A. at 56.) These included that:
One of its major purposes of, or result of, an
identification sign must be to establish a specific
destination point that will be generally recognized
by the public as being at a set geographical
location. There must be evidence of intended
longevity of the sign adequate to sustain the
designated point concept. It cannot be as
transitory as a commercial billboard. However, it
need not be immune from unexpected, unforeseen
or unwelcome circumstances that might result in
a termination. Either the owner of the facility or
a principal long term space user thereof should be
8

in control of the destiny of any such sign, rather
than having control turned over to some third
party, to assure continuing compliance with the
necessary attributes.
Id.
In applying these criteria to Melrose’s applications, the
Board expressed particular concern with the longevity
requirement and with the transfer of building identification
rights, which it noted may lead to frequent changes for
commercial purposes. Frequent changes in the content of signs
and a lack of longevity were deemed inconsistent with the
purposes of building Identification Signs – directing the public
towards a specific geographical location. The Zoning Board
distinguished Melrose’s failure to provide evidence of an
intention to keep the building names for a substantial period of
time from the twenty-year agreement entered into by the Steelers
and Heinz. It also noted in its decisions that Melrose’s
representative had testified that the purpose of the signs was to
direct individuals to the website business in order to make a
profit.
Melrose filed this action in the Western District of
Pennsylvania, alleging that Defendants – the City of Pittsburgh,
the Pittsburgh Zoning Board, and the three individual members
of the Zoning Board – violated its First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by arbitrarily denying its sign applications.
Melrose asserted two claims pursuant to Section 1983: first, that
Defendants deprived it of its First Amendment free speech
rights when they impermissibly limited the content of its signs;
and second, that Defendants deprived it of its Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection rights by treating similarly situated
entities more favorably. Melrose also brought a third claim
pursuant to the equal protection clause of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
The case was referred to a Magistrate Judge for pretrial
proceedings. The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and
Recommendation regarding Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment and Melrose’s motion for partial summary judgment,
recommending that the District Court grant Defendants’
summary judgment motion and deny Melrose’s motion. The
9

Magistrate Judge evaluated Melrose’s First Amendment claims
in light of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), which sets forth
a framework for assessing restrictions on commercial speech.
Under this four-part analysis, the court
must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For
commercial speech to come within that provision,
it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary
to serve that interest.
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The Magistrate Judge found
the proposed speech to be misleading, but nonetheless
proceeded to examine the remaining factors. The Magistrate
Judge concluded that the city had a substantial interest in
restricting the placement of advertising signs, that the denial of
Melrose’s signs substantially advanced this interest, and that the
regulation was not overly restrictive. The Magistrate Judge also
rejected Melrose’s equal protection claims, finding that since the
regulations passed muster under Central Hudson’s commercial
speech test, they necessarily survived equal protection analysis.
Melrose filed objections and the District Court conducted
a de novo review of the record. The District Court adopted the
Report and Recommendation in part and rejected it in part,
ultimately granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The Court, applying Central Hudson, rejected the Magistrate
Judge’s finding that the proposed building names were
misleading. Nonetheless, it ultimately adopted the Report and
Recommendation’s conclusion that the regulations constituted
valid restrictions on commercial speech and did not violate
Melrose’s First Amendment rights. The Court held that the
application related to the building Melrose intended to name
“Baruch Atah Hashem” was not properly before it because
Melrose had failed to reapply and brief the possible
10

constitutional claim related to that application. Melrose does
not raise this issue on appeal. The District Court rejected
Melrose’s argument that the term “Building Identification Sign”
is unconstitutionally vague, either on its face or as applied.
Finally, the Court rejected three additional objections to the
Report and Recommendation and found that, even if summary
judgment was not appropriate, the individual Defendants were
entitled to immunity. Melrose filed a timely notice of appeal.
II.
The District Court exercised jurisdiction over Melrose’s
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over
a district court’s summary judgment ruling. Bus. Edge Group,
Inc. v. Champion Mortgage Co., Inc., 519 F.3d 150, 153 n.5 (3d
Cir. 2008). We apply the same standard as the District Court:
“Summary judgment is appropriate only where, drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ruehl v. Viacom,
Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 380 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). In a case such as this, which
involves First Amendment issues, an appellate court must “make
an independent examination of the whole record.” Bose Corp.
v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
III.
As Melrose clarified at oral argument, its challenge
focuses on the Zoning Board’s method of applying the sign
ordinances and determining whether a purported Identification
Sign, which has an advertising aspect, can still properly be
classified as an Identification Sign. The District Court’s
decision analysed Melrose’s claims by applying the framework
articulated in Central Hudson. While we agree with the District
Court’s conclusion – that the Zoning Board’s decisions rejecting
Melrose’s sign applications did not violate Melrose’s First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights – we hold that the proper
framework for evaluating these claims is governed by our
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decision in Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043 (3d Cir.
1994).4
A.

Melrose’s First Amendment Claim

In Rappa, we articulated a framework for determining
whether a statute is content-based or content-neutral. This
determination is the first step in a First Amendment analysis, as
the answer dictates the standard that we apply in reviewing the
ordinance at issue. Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1053 (quoting Police
Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972)); see also Riel
v. City of Bradford, 485 F.3d 736, 743 (3d Cir. 2007). If the
statute is content-based, the government must “show that the
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Rappa, 18 F.3d at
1053 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988))
(internal quotation marks omitted). If instead the statute is
found to be content-neutral in that it “merely restricts the total
quantity of speech by regulating the time, the place or the
manner in which one can speak, a very different test applies.”
Id. (citations omitted). Under this test, the government is
permitted to “impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place,
or manner of protected speech, provided [1] the restrictions ‘are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, [2] that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and [3] that they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.’”
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)
(quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 293 (1984)) (further citation omitted).
4

Central Hudson, which the District Court applied in
evaluating Melrose’s claims, provides the framework for
evaluating restrictions on commercial speech, particularly
restrictions that distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech based on content. That is not the situation
here. As we discuss more fully infra, we find that the Zoning
Board’s determination was not content-based, but instead
constituted a context-sensitive analysis that sought to determine
whether there was a significant relationship between the content
of the signs and their specific location, such that they could truly
be deemed Identification Signs.
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Melrose contends that the Zoning Code was applied to its
applications in a content-based manner and that no showing was
made of a compelling state interest. In response, the City argues
that the sign ordinance was applied in a permissible contentneutral manner. In Riel, a case also involving First Amendment
challenges to municipal sign ordinances, we observed that
“determining whether a statute is content-based or
content-neutral has not been entirely straightforward.” 485 F.3d
at 744. Riel analyzed and applied the framework that we set
forth in Rappa for making this determination.
Rappa likewise involved a First Amendment challenge
to outdoor sign ordinances. In seeking to determine “the current
state of First Amendment law pertaining to outdoor signs,” we
discussed at length the Supreme Court’s splintered decision in
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981),
which dealt with a San Diego ordinance regarding billboards.
Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1047. We found that a clear governing
standard could not be derived from the plurality and concurrence
in Metromedia and concluded that, given significant differences
between the ordinances at issue in both cases, the result in
Metromedia did not control our decision in Rappa. Id. at 1061.
Instead, we articulated and then applied a “context-sensitive”
analysis for determining whether a restriction on speech,
including a sign ordinance, is content-neutral or content-based.
We explained in Rappa that “[s]ome signs are more important
than others” because
they are more related to the particular location
than are other signs. Allowing such “contextsensitive” signs while banning others is not
discriminating in favor of the content of these
signs; rather, it is accommodating the special
nature of such signs so that the messages they
contain have an equal chance to be
communicated.
Id. at 1064. As an example, we noted that “[a] sign identifying
a commercial establishment is more important on its premises
than is a sign advertising an unrelated product.” Id.
Determining whether a sign is related to the location
where it is placed inevitably demands a consideration of the
13

sign’s content. But this consideration does not by itself
constitute a lack of neutrality as to specific content. Summing
up our analysis, we held in Rappa that:
[W]hen there is a significant relationship between
the content of particular speech and a specific
location or its use, the state can exempt from a
general ban speech having that content so long as
the state did not make the distinction in an attempt
to censor certain viewpoints or to control what
issues are appropriate for public debate and so
long as the exception also survives the test
proposed by the Metromedia concurrence: i.e., the
state must show that the exception is substantially
related to advancing an important state interest
that is at least as important as the interests
advanced by the underlying regulation, that the
exception is no broader than necessary to advance
the special goal, and that the exception is
narrowly drawn so as to impinge as little as
possible on the overall goal.
Id. at 1065 (internal footnotes omitted).5 We outlined two ways
through which the requirement that a sign be significantly
related to a specific location might be satisfied. First, a sign
could be particularly important to travelers on a nearby road,
such as a directional sign. Second, it could be shown “that a
sign better conveys its information in its particular location than
it could anywhere else – for example, an address sign.” Id.
Hence, as we summarized in Riel, the core of Rappa’s holding
is that exceptions such as those at issue in this case do not
constitute content-based restrictions that we analyze using a

5

In Rappa, we described the Metromedia concurrence’s
test as “essentially a more stringent version of the time, place,
and manner test.” 18 F.3d at 1059 n.22. Accordingly, we need
not separately apply that test in situations where the Rappa
analysis is appropriate. See Riel, 485 F.3d at 751 (applying the
“general test for time, place, and manner restrictions,” rather
than Rappa, when “an exemption is not even arguably based on
the content of the speech”).
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strict scrutiny framework. Instead, we employ “a more flexible,
context-specific approach.” Riel, 485 F.3d at 746.
Before applying the Rappa framework to the ordinance
in this case, we first frame the issue before us. The Pittsburgh
Zoning Code bans what it defines as Advertising Signs from
certain areas of the city, including those in which the buildings
at issue in this case are located. However, the Zoning Code
permits signs classified as Identification Signs within those
same zoning districts. Ordinances that exempt identification
signs from a general ban on signs represent “a classic
application of Rappa’s context-specific rule.” Id. at 750. Such
signs clearly better convey their information at the location they
are intended to identify, rendering them similar to address signs.
Id. They also promote public order by providing the public with
information regarding specific buildings. Id. at 751.
The more complex issue in this case, however, is
presented by the fact that Melrose seeks to classify its signs,
which admittedly possess an advertising component, as
Identification Signs. It claims that the signs do not merely
advertise a web address, but in fact name the buildings they
adorn. The Zoning Code, by not allowing Advertising Signs
within the relevant zoning districts, creates a general ban on
advertising speech in those areas. However, the four criteria
that the Zoning Board has articulated and applied in the Heinz
Field case and in Melrose’s cases allow for an exception to this
general ban when such advertising is conveyed through a sign
that, although it has advertising characteristics, remains a
genuine Identification Sign.
As the Zoning Board declared in its decision approving
the Heinz Field signs, “[w]here a sign has components of
advertising and identification, we must determine whether the
purported building identification is genuine or merely an effort
to utilize the location as an advertising vehicle.” (Supp. App. at
11.) The four criteria articulated by the Zoning Board for
making this determination provide a framework for evaluating
whether a “significant relationship” exists between the content
of such signs and the specific location in which they are placed.
See Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1066. There is no indication that the City
sought to “censor certain viewpoints” when it articulated and
15

applied these criteria. Id. at 1065. We therefore conclude that
the city’s four criteria satisfy the first part of the test we set forth
in Rappa.
Accordingly, we proceed to the second portion of the
Rappa framework. Here, we consider whether the Zoning
Board’s exception – for certain Identification Signs that have an
advertising component, but that by satisfying the four criteria
indicate that they are still a genuine Identification Sign –
survives the test set forth in the Metromedia concurrence.
Under this test we first examine whether “the exception is
substantially related to advancing an important state interest that
is at least as important as the interests advanced by the
underlying regulation.” Id. The City clearly has an important
interest in allowing the public to identify a particular name with
a geographic location, enabling the public to recognize and find
these locations.6 A sign located at the structure that it names
“better conveys its information in that location than it could
anywhere else.” Riel, 485 F.3d at 750. The four criteria serve
this interest by creating a narrow exception that allows for a
small number of Identification Signs, which also possess
advertising aspects, when there are facts that indicate that the
true intent behind the sign is to identify the premises where it is
located and that the name depicted will remain constant for a
significant period of time. The signs at issue in this case, which
also possess advertising characteristics, create a tension between
the City’s aesthetic interest in limiting the proliferation of
Advertising Signs, which the sign regulations advance, and its
interest in allowing Identification Signs. See Metromedia, 453
U.S. at 507-08 (identifying the “appearance of the city” as a
“substantial government goal[]”). The Zoning Board’s four
criteria set forth a reasoned framework for resolving this tension
6

To the extent that Melrose contends that this exception
is specifically directed at permitting the phenomenon of naming
rights at large facilities, we also recognize an important state
interest in facilitating such naming agreements. As the City
stated at oral argument, both the City and the public at large
have an important interest in enabling the construction of such
facilities, which benefit from the financial support that derives
from sponsorship agreements.
16

and allow for a narrow exception to the general ban on
advertising when advertising is an aspect of a sign that is
genuinely intended to be an Identification Sign and therefore
serves important state interests, including “public order,” Riel,
485 F.3d at 751, and “traffic safety,” Metromedia, 453 U.S. at
507-08.
We recognize that naming rights represent a unique
phenomenon. An entity that purchases such rights seeks to
benefit not simply from having signs at the location that
advertise its name, but also from having the public associate its
name with the venue. As one commentator has observed:
Perhaps the single most important factor in a
naming rights agreement is the understanding that
the corporate sponsor’s name will be used in
association with the venue at all times by venue
management and tenants. This use facilitates
media usage in all communications and leads to
recognition within the local as well as the national
media. Compared with the traditional media
advertising, where the broadcast of a
thirty-second prime time television spot can cost
$1-$2 million, it becomes apparent why naming
rights are efficient marketing.
Christian Maximillian Voigt, “What’s Really in the Package of
a Naming Rights Deal?” Service Mark Rights and the Naming
Rights of Professional Sports Stadiums, 11 J. Intell. Prop. L.
327, 330 (2004) (internal footnotes omitted). Hence the
purchase of naming rights can prove lucrative for a sponsor for
reasons beyond whether or not the sponsor is able to have signs
with its name erected on the facility’s exterior. The exterior
signs on such facilities do not, by themselves, “name” the venue,
but instead aid the public in recognizing a specific destination.
As such, they “promote public order by providing information
about the building[].” Riel, 485 F.3d at 751.
We turn to the second and third portions of the test
delineated in the Metromedia concurrence. We find that the
Zoning Board’s criteria create an “exception [that] is no broader
than necessary” to allow for genuine Identification Signs that
possess an advertising aspect and that they are “narrowly drawn
17

so as to impinge as little as possible on the overall goal” of
preventing the proliferation of advertising signs in certain
locales. Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1065. The four criteria narrowly
tailor this exception by requiring applicants to show that such
signs are intended to establish a generally recognized destination
point of interest to a significant segment of the public; that they
are intended to remain in place for a significant period of time,
which will both establish and sustain the public’s recognition of
the destination point; and that the owner or principal user of the
premises, who is likely to have a vested interest in the stability
of its identification, possesses control over the signs.
These criteria serve to prevent a proliferation of
Advertising Signs with rapidly changing content that purport to
be Identification Signs. As such they are “narrowly drawn so as
to impinge as little as possible on the overall goal” of the City’s
sign regulations. Id. at 1065. The longevity criteria and the
requirement that the owner or principal user of a building
possesses control over the sign reinforce the City’s interest in
allowing the public to associate a given name with a specific
location and narrowly tailor the scope of this exception. Clearly,
it behooves the owner or principal user of a building,
particularly one who operates a business on the premise, to
ensure that signs on the building remain consistent and that they
allow the public to easily ascertain and remember its location.
In Metromedia, the Supreme Court deemed it reasonable for a
city to believe that “offsite advertising, with its periodically
changing content, presents a more acute problem than does
onsite advertising.” 453 U.S. at 511 (citation omitted). Implicit
in this statement is the assumption that onsite advertising, for a
business at the location, will change less frequently than the
contents of a commercial billboard at the same premises.
Certainly a commercial tenant is not likely to move as frequently
as a billboard might be changed for new advertising.
Analogously, we find that the Zoning Board’s concern with a
building’s owner or primary tenant having control over the
content of signs, in conjunction with the other criteria, serves to
ensure that the exception remains narrow. An owner or primary
tenant would likely have more invested in ensuring that the signs
that identify the premise remain stable than would a party with
no interest in the premises beyond its control of the signs. In
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summary, we conclude that the Zoning Board’s consideration of
the content of signs with an advertising aspect, for the purpose
of determining whether they satisfy these criteria and can
properly be classified as Identification Signs, constitutes a
“context-sensitive” analysis and is not improper.
Melrose’s signs clearly fail to satisfy these criteria. No
showing has been made of intended longevity. In fact, Melrose
asserted its right to change the content of its signs as frequently
as it wished. Nor is Melrose, which controls the signs, the
owner of the buildings or their primary tenant. Finally,
Melrose’s contention that its proposed building names would
serve the public interest by identifying specific geographic
locations, for purposes including the calling of emergency
assistance, is undermined by the fact that it sought to name three
distinct buildings “palegalhelp.com.” Accordingly, we find that
Melrose failed by a wide margin to satisfy the four criteria.
We also reject Melrose’s contention that the criteria
created an impermissibly subjective or vague standard. The
Supreme Court has held that “[a] government regulation that
allows arbitrary application is inherently inconsistent with a
valid time, place, and manner regulation because such discretion
has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a
particular point of view.” Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). This is true even for a facially neutral
provision. Riel, 485 F.3d at 755. Accordingly, to avoid the
danger of censorship, “a law subjecting the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license must
contain narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the
licensing authority.” Forsyth County, Ga., 505 U.S. at 131
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Permitting
schemes under which decision makers are “guided only by their
own ideas of public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good
order, morals or convenience” have been rejected.
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 394 U.S. 147, 150
(1969) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoted in Riel, 485
F.3d at 755). In Shuttlesworth, the Court found unconstitutional
a scheme that allowed the city commission to reject a parade
permit if “in its judgment” any of these general concerns
“require that it be refused.” Id. at 150-51.
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In contrast, in Riel we approved a permit standard that
required an architectural review board to review sign and
display applications “for conformity in exterior material
composition, exterior structural design, external appearance and
size of similar advertising or information media used in the
architectural period of the district in accordance with the
Resource Inventory of building architectural styles of the [city’s]
Historic District.” Riel, 485 F.3d at 755 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). We found that this standard did not
afford “unbridled discretion,” but instead limited the review to
consideration of certain identified factors. Id. at 756. The
ordinance at issue also established certain objective standards
for material, border, and typeface. Finally, we noted that the
nine-member review board “guards against applicants being
subjected to the whim or caprice of one single official.” Id.
Although some room for subjective judgment remained, “the
First Amendment does not require the complete absence of such
judgment.” Id.
Applying this standard to the Pittsburgh Zoning Board’s
four criteria – which the Zoning Board has outlined in its
decisions as the framework for determining whether a sign with
an advertising aspect can still be classified as an Identification
Sign – we find that the criteria are not impermissibly vague or
subjective. Instead, they represent “narrow, objective, and
definite standards” that guide the Zoning Board’s decision
making. They do not leave this determination subject to a
decision maker’s judgment regarding expansive concepts such
as “public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order,
morals or convenience.” Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 150. One
criterion, which requires that the sign be controlled by an owner
or principal user of the facility, provides an objectively
verifiable standard. The other criteria are also narrow in scope,
requiring an evaluation of definite factors including the intended
longevity of the sign, the importance to the public of the
location to be identified by the sign, and whether the sign’s
major purposes include the establishment of a specific
destination point to be generally recognized by the public at a set
location.7 Finally, the Zoning Board, which applies these
7

Melrose specifically argues that the longevity
requirement has been applied subjectively, citing other buildings
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criteria in reviewing the Zoning Administrator’s decisions, is
comprised of three members, which protects against the “whim
or caprice of one single official.” Riel, 485 F.3d at 756. We
conclude that the criteria articulated and applied by the Zoning
Board in this case do not confer “unbridled” discretion and are
neither unconstitutionally subjective nor vague.
For these reasons, Melrose’s First Amendment claims
fail.
B.

Melrose’s Equal Protection Claim

Melrose also raises an equal protection challenge to the
application of the Zoning Code to its sign applications.8 It
contends that the Zoning Board treated its applications
differently than those for new signage at Heinz Field, PNC Park,
Mellon Arena, and I.C. Light Amphitheater. According to
Melrose’s complaint, “large, corporate, commercial entities” are
allowed to name buildings in Pittsburgh “without any
restrictions,” while Melrose is subject to “arbitrary, capricious
and irrational discrimination.” (J.A. at 144.) Melrose further
insinuates in its brief on appeal that this allegedly disparate

that have had frequent name changes. This argument is
unavailing; the names at the buildings cited were changed when
the building’s major tenant changed. Longevity is not a general
principle the Board applies to all signs, but rather a criterion it
has chosen to apply in attempting to determine whether a sign
that has an advertising component is still primarily an
Identification Sign, rather than simply advertising. Accordingly,
the failure to apply a longevity requirement to all signs in the
City of Pittsburgh is not evidence of improper subjectivity.
8

Melrose brings equal protection challenges pursuant to
both the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article 1, § 26 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. Our analysis of Melrose’s federal equal protection
claims is equally applicable to its equal protection claims under
the Pennsylvania Constitution. Kramer v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeal Bd., 883 A.2d 518, 532 (Pa. 2005); see also Busch v.
Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., 567 F.3d 89, 95 n.6 (3d Cir. 2009).
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treatment was also motivated by the taxpayer funding of the
construction of these other facilities.
“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should
be treated alike.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citation omitted).
In
Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Township, we discussed the
“two-step inquiry” outlined in City of Cleburne for reviewing an
equal protection challenge to a zoning ordinance. 309 F.3d 120,
136-37 (3d Cir. 2002). This inquiry “properly places the initial
burden on the complaining party first to demonstrate that it is
‘similarly situated’ to an entity that is being treated differently
before the local municipality must offer a justification for its
ordinance.” Id. at 137. Our analysis in this case begins and
ends at this first step. Melrose has clearly failed to establish that
it is similarly situated to those entities whose signs have been
approved. As outlined supra, Melrose’s sign applications
simply fail to satisfy the criteria outlined by the Zoning Board
for determining whether a sign with advertising aspects can still
properly be classified as an Identification Sign.
To the extent that Melrose challenges the criteria
themselves, rather than their application to its cases, we reject
this argument for the same reason we rejected Melrose’s First
Amendment claims. Having determined that the criteria are not
content-based, but instead facilitate a contextual analysis, we
find that they survive scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause. See Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 283 (3d
Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the state shows a satisfactory rationale for
a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation, that
regulation necessarily survives scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause.”) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). 9
9

Melrose briefly argues that the District Court made
findings of fact that should have been left for the jury and not
resolved at summary judgment. However, Melrose fails to
actually identify any material factual determinations made by the
District Court. Accordingly, we find this argument to be
22

IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District
Court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of
Defendants.

without merit.
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